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ARTICLES
THE LEGALITY OF USING EMPLOYEE

APPEARANCE POLICIES TO PROMOTE
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
Dennis R. Kuhn* & John A. PearceII**

INTRODUCTION

An organizational culture is a learned body of tradition consisting
of the beliefs, norms, values, and premises that are held by the members
of an organization, and provides the basis for behavior that satisfies the
standards of group membership. Since organizational culture influences
employee attitudes on commitment, motivation, morale, and satisfaction,
effective management requires attempts to shape the culture in the
company's best interest. Critically important in the development of
culture is an inclusionary dimension. Morality and legality require that
organizations exercise special care to accommodate gender and diversity
needs to help assure equality in the workplace. Therefore, the shaping of
organizational culture through company policies provides an important
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opportunity to recognize the legitimate needs of all employees.
Since it is also essential to balance the interests of the organization
with those of the employees, laws have been established to curtail the
judgment and discretion of employers in their development and
protection of an organizational culture. This article discusses legal
challenges that have been mounted against some of these policies. The
success or failure of these challenges - which deal specifically with the
appearance of employees - provides employees with safeguards for their
individual and collective rights. Court rulings on these challenges also
provide managers with safeguards for the discretion that is warranted in
the development of policies designed to create and sustain a legal, and
inclusive, organizational culture.
I. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Employee interactions over time, coupled with management
policies and practices, create a value system that influences how
members of a company behave. The common perception that develops
regarding "the way things get done around here," is known as a
company's organizational culture.1 It helps to determine how employees
interact with each other, managers, customers and other company
stakeholders, and how they identify problems, analyze information, and
make decisions.
An organizational culture is, thus, a learned body of tradition
consisting of the beliefs, norms, values, and premises that are held by the
members of an organization, providing the basis for behavior that
satisfies the standards of group membership.2 Since the organizational
culture influences employee attitudes on commitment, motivation,

1. ROB GOFFEE & GARETH JONES, THE CHARACTER OF A CORPORATION: How YOUR
COMPANY'S CULTURE CAN MAKE OR BREAK YOUR BUSINESS 9 (1998). See generally Harrison M.

Trice & Janice M. Beyer, CulturalLeadership in Organizations,2 ORG. SCI. 149 (1991) (discussing
the impact of leadership on the culture of organizations); Geert Hofstede et al., Measuring
Organizational Cultures: A Qualitative and Quantitative Study across Twenty Cases, 35 ADMIN.

Sci. Q. 286 (1990) (taking a qualitative and quantitative approach to the study of organizational
cultures).
2. See James R. Detert, Roger G. Schroeder & John J. Mauriel, A Frameworkfor Linking
Culture and Improvement Initiatives in Organizations, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 850, 851-52 (2000).

See generally Geert Hofstede, Michael Harris Bond & Chung-leung Luk, Individual Perceptions of
Organizational Cultures: A Methodological Treatise on Levels of Analysis, 14 ORG. STUD. 483

(1993) (suggesting a methodology for studying organizational cultures from the individual
perspective).
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morale, and satisfaction, 3 effective management requires attempts to
shape the organizational culture in the company's best interests.4

II. THE NEED FOR LIMITS ON POLICIES THAT PRESCRIBE
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
To help refine and defend their organizational culture, managers
establish formal and informal expectations for their employees,
including policies that seek to delimit employee conduct. Policies are
directives designed to standardize many routine decisions and to clarify
the discretion that employees can exercise on-the-job.5 Creating policies
that guide and "preauthorize" the thinking, decisions, and actions of
employees is an essential task for executives in establishing and
controlling the ongoing processes of a firm in a manner consistent with a
company's organizational culture.6
Policies that promote the improvement and perpetuation of an
organizational culture also provide important safeguards for employees.
They guarantee a "comfort zone" for employees, within which they can
freely express their preferences, without endangering their standing in
their company. Further, policies promote consistency and predictability
in managerial action, which enable employees to anticipate correct
behavior that will be supported and rewarded.
As will be discussed in Part III of this article, company policies that
are designed to control employee appearance are particularly important
to a business, especially when employees have contact with the public.
Employee appearances that are outside the norms of public expectation
may lead customers to turn elsewhere. In addition, a non-conforming

3. See Randall Y. Odom, W. Randy Boxx & Mark G. Dunn, Organizational Cultures,
Commitment, Satisfaction, and Cohesion, 14 PUB. PRODUCTIVITY & MGMT. REV. 157, 166 (1990)

(arguing that innovative and supportive cultures positively correlate with employee commitment,
satisfaction, and cohesion); Stanley G. Harris & Kevin W. Mossholder, The Affective Implications
of Perceived Congruence with Culture Dimensions During Organizational Transformation, 22 J.

MGMT. 527, 527 (1996) ("[Tlhe discrepancy between individuals' assessments of the current culture
and their ideal culture explained significant variance in . . . organizational commitment and
optimism about the organization's future.").
4. See GOFFEE & JONES, supra note 1, at 6-8; Geert Hofstede, Attitudes, Values and
Organizational Culture: Disentangling the Concepts, 19 ORG. STUD. 477, 491 (1998); Geert
Hofstede, Identifying OrganizationalSubcultures: An EmpiricalApproach, 35 J. MGMT. STUD. 1,

10-11 (1998); Andrew H. Gold, Arvind Malhotra & Albert H. Segars, Knowledge Management: An
OrganizationalCapabilitiesPerspective, 18 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 185, 189-90 (2001).
5. JOHN A. PEARCE II & RICHARD B. ROBINSON JR., STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT:
FORMULATION, IMPLEMENTATION, AND CONTROL 303-04 (10th ed. 2007).

6. See id. at 303-06.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

3

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 1
184

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 24:181

employee may create tensions and distractions for other employees,
which can disrupt their interactions with one another and adversely
affect the productivity of a business.
The desire of managers to minimize threats to an organizational
culture, posed by the discordant appearance of employees, is
understandable. It raises the issue as to whether the standards set by an
employer in making hiring, retention and promotional decisions have
more to do with the ability of the individual or with stereotypical
thinking. To balance the interests of an organization with those of an
employee or job applicant, federal, state, and local governments have
established laws aimed at curtailing the judgment and discretion of
employers in their development and protection of an organizational
culture. 7

Several federal laws have been enacted that affect the creation of
appearance policies. In particular, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 limits an employer's appearance standards if the standards
discriminate against individuals because of race, sex, religion, natural
origin, or color. 8 The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits policies
that cause discrimination against employees, who possess a physical or
mental disability, where the individual is qualified for a position with or
without a reasonable accommodation from the employer. 9 Finally, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act bars employers from creating
standards that affect employment opportunities for individuals based
upon such individual's age. 10
Claims under these statutes proceed under the theories of disparate
treatment and/or disparate impact." Under disparate treatment, a
plaintiff contends that an employer's standards are treating him or her
less favorably than others because of his or her membership in a class
protected by statute. 12 This "intentional discrimination" by the employer
can be established through circumstantial evidence. 13 The employer can
defend its position by demonstrating that there was a legitimate,

7. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
8. Id.
9.
10.
11.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12113 (2000).
20 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2000).
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) ("[Glood intent or absence of

discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures... [that] are unrelated to measuring
job capability."). See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792 (1973)

(establishing the elements and defenses in disparate treatment cases).
12.
13.

See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
See id. at 804-05.
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nondiscriminatory reason for the decision.14 The plaintiff is entitled to
rebut the stated reason by showing it is a pretext and that the real reason
is tied to an intention to discriminate.15
With disparate impact, a plaintiff contends that while the standard
an employer is using appears neutral on its face, it has a discriminatory
impact on individuals in a protected group.16 For example, a minimum
height standard, while appearing neutral, could have an adverse effect on
an individual because of gender or national origin. In these cases, an
employer can defend the policy by showing that the standard is needed
because of the necessities of their business. 17 The plaintiff can rebut this
justification by showing that there is a different standard that the
employer could use which would have a less adverse impact on the
protected group, while still meeting the employer's objectives. 8
The sections that follow discuss legal challenges that have been
mounted against company policies that were established to build and
protect organizational culture. The success or failure of these challenges
- which deal specifically with the appearance of employees - provides
employees with safeguards for their individual and collective rights, and
managers with safeguards for the discretion that is warranted in the
development of policies designed to create, and sustain, an
organizational culture.
III. POLICIES ON APPEARANCE
When employees have contact with the public, the employer may
believe it is particularly important that the employees project an image
that is consistent with the company's organizational culture.
Consequently, managers frequently consider an array of policies aimed
at controlling employee appearance including: restrictions on hair length
or hairstyle, the presence of facial hair, the style or type of clothing worn
on-the-job, jewelry or cosmetics that can be worn, and the body weight
of employees. While the courts have given employers considerable
latitude in creating these policies, federal, state and local law do place
some important limitations on their content.

14. Id. at 802.
15. Id. at 804.
16. Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Eatman v. UPS, 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988)).
17. See id. at 267 (citing Smith v. Xerox Corp, 196 F.3d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1999)).
18. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,425 (1975).
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A. Regulation of hairlength
Employees contesting employer policies that seek to control hair
length have mounted a number of challenges. 19 Typically, these claims
have revolved around assertions of gender, race, or religious
discrimination. 20 For instance, men who claim sex discrimination,
because the employer limits the length of hair for male employees but
the same standards to women, have brought a number of
does not apply
21
such suits.
Such was the case in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing
Co., where a man was denied employment because of his shoulder
length hair.22 The company's grooming code required employees to be
neatly dressed and groomed in accordance with the standards of the
business community.23 The company interpreted this as excluding men,
but not women, from having long hair.24
The lower court found that the Macon Telegraph Publishing Co.
standard did not violate Title VII. 25 However, a divided panel of the
26
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the lower court's ruling.
Essentially, the panel found that the Supreme Court's decision in
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.27 should control.28 In Phillips, the
Supreme Court found that Title VII not only covered cases where the
employer discriminated by denying employment opportunities based on
gender, but also where the employer
added a requirement that applied to
29
one gender but not the other.
On rehearing, the full Fifth Circuit vacated the panel's decision and

19. E.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 1975); Aros v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661,662 (D.C. Cal. 1972); Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of Am.,

337 F. Supp. 1357, 1358 (D.C. Cal. 1972).
20. E.g., Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1088; Vargas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 97-CV-75020DT, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21148, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 1998); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
21. E.g., Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1088; Aros, 348 F. Supp. at 662; Donohue, 337 F. Supp. at
1358.
22. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1087.
23. Id.
24. Id.

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
28. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1089 (citing Phillips, 400 U.S. at 545).
29. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 543-44. In Phillips, the employer disqualified women who had
preschool children from employment. Id. at 543. However, men with preschool children were not
disqualified. Id.
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affirmed the lower court's decision. 30 It found that Title VII was aimed
at prohibiting discrimination because of certain immutable
characteristics, or because it interfered with a fundamental right of the
individual.31 Immutable characteristics relate to issues that include
gender, race, color, or national origin. A person's hair length is not
immutable because it is something a person can choose to alter or not. A
fundamental right involves the right to marry, have children, or practice
religion, but does not include the right to have long hair, even where the
individual claims it is a form of self-expression.33
The court believed that the Willingham case related more to how a
company decided to run its business than to sexual discrimination. 34 If
Willingham had been hired, he would have been in a position which
would require contact with potential customers of the business.3 5 The
court accepted the employer's contention that, in the community where
the employer operated, people did not have a positive opinion of men
with long hair.36 Thus, Willingham's
appearance could have a
37
detrimental impact on their business.
The lower court in Willingham pointed out that if the plaintiffs
argument was accepted, it would mean that if an employer allowed
female employees to wear dresses, lipstick, eye shadow, and earrings to
work, then the employer would have to allow men the same privilege. 38
The court stated that to argue Congress intended such a result when it
passed Title VII would be "ridiculous., 39 The court further stated that
employers should not be forced to accept behavior that is out of the
norm for customary grooming, and not related to a fundamental right,
where it could have adverse implications for a business.40
Some lower federal courts have been willing to consider the
possibility that hair length policies that discriminate between men and
women could be a basis for a discrimination claim. 4 ' However, the

30. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1087.
31. Id. at 1092.

32. Id.at 1091.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1087.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 352 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (M.D. Ga. 1972).
39. Id.
40. See id. at 1021-22.
41. E.g., Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of Am., 337 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (D.C. Cal. 1972); Roberts
v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1055, 1056-57 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
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have supported the Fifth
circuit courts that have reviewed
42 this issue
Circuit's position in Willingham.
Claims of religious discrimination under Title VII have also arisen
regarding employer regulations on hair.43 Unlike contentions of race,
gender, color, or national origin discrimination, Title VII requires that an
employer must offer a reasonable accommodation to an employee when
an employment policy conflicts with an employee's religious beliefs44 or
practices, unless it would create an undue hardship for the employer.
The Supreme Court has set a low threshold for an employer to meet
in order to satisfy the reasonable accommodation requirement.45 In TWA
v. Hardison, the Court determined that if the available accommodations
create more than a de minimis burden, the employer is not required to
offer it. 46 The Court refined this requirement in Ansonia Board of
Education v. Philbrook,47 where it concluded that once an employer
offered a reasonable accommodation it met its obligation even if the
employee offered, and preferred, a reasonable alternative. 48
In Vargas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., a district court dealt with a
policy that required employees to maintain hair in a neat and trimmed
manner. 49 When Vargas was hired, he was in compliance with the
policy. 50 Shortly thereafter, his hair reached ponytail length. 51 He was
then advised that his hair was not acceptable, but the company took no
other formal action.52 Subsequently, after a change in supervisors, he
was told to bring his hair into compliance. 53 At that point, he informed

42. E.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm't Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 (1lth Cir. 1998); Tavora
v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996); Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d
400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977); Earwood v. Cont'l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976);
Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507
F.2d 895, 896 (9th Cir. 1974); Fagan v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1124 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
43. E.g., Vargas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 97-CV-75020-DT, 1998 U.S. Dist LEXIS
21148, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 1998).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
45. See generally TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (holding that if an
accommodation would create more than a de minimis burden, the employer is not required to offer
the accommodation).
46. Id. at 84-85.
47. 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
48. Id. at 68.
49. Vargas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 97-CV-75020-DT, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21148, at
*4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 1998).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at *4-5.
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the company that the length of his hair was due to 54
his religious beliefs as
religion.
American
Native
traditional
of
a follower
With this new information, the company attempted to provide an
accommodation by telling him to tuck his hair underneath his shirt or
jacket.55 Vargas rejected the direction. 5 6 During his deposition, Vargas
testified that tucking his hair underneath a garment would violate his
religious conviction. 57 He never offered an alternative and demanded he
be allowed to wear his hair as he wanted. 58
In granting the employer's motion for summary judgment, the court
concluded that Vargas had a duty to cooperate with the employer's
efforts to offer a reasonable accommodation. 59 Vargas' conduct did not
meet that obligation. 6° As a result, the court found that he could not raise
the question of whether the company's accommodation was
reasonable. 6'
B. Policies affecting hairstyles
Related to the issue of hair length are employer efforts to regulate
the hairstyles of employees. Employee challenges to this type of policy
have been raised in cases where the employees contended that the
employer discriminated against them on the basis of race or religion.62
In Eatman v. UPS, an African-American male driver who had been
employed for six years began to wear his hair in tight, hand-rolled
spirals commonly referred to as "dreadlocks. 63 His supervisors
informed him that the style was in conflict with the employer's
appearance policy that required hair be worn in a "business-like
manner." 64 Eatman claimed that the locks were a reflection of his
commitment to his Protestant faith.65 Initially, he complied with the

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

*5.
*5-6.
*6.
*8.
*9.
*14, *19.

60. Id. at*16-18.
61. Id. at*19.
62. E.g., Eatman v. UPS, 194 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (involving an AfricanAmerican former employee with dreadlocks who brought suit against his former employer, claiming
that the employer discriminated against him based upon his race and religion).
63. Id. at 258,260.
64. Id. at 259-60.
65. Id. at 259.
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company's willingness to allow any employee that was not in
compliance with the policy to wear a hat. 66 Due to the nature of his
hairstyle, the only type of hat that Eastman decided he was eligible to
wear was made of Wool. 67 After wearing the hat for a period of time, he
objected claiming that it made him feel faint, gave him headaches, and
destroyed some of his locks. 68 Ultimately, Eatman refused to wear the
hat and was subsequently terminated.69
In considering Eatman's claim that the employer had engaged in
religious discrimination, because of its failure to offer him a reasonable
accommodation, the court recited the requirements that a plaintiff first
needed to prove .70 Requirements included that:
(1) He have a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with the
employer's policy;
(2) He informed the employer of the belief; and
7
(3) He was disciplined because he did not comply. '

The court concluded that Eatman failed to meet these requirements
for two reasons.12 First, he failed to show that his conduct was prompted
by a religious belief.73 There was no evidence that the locks were a
mandate of his religion.74 Rather, it appeared to the court that the style
was a matter of his "personal choice., 75 Secondly, Eatman failed to
prove that he informed the employer that the hat requirement conflicted
with his religious beliefs.76
Eatman also raised the claim that the application of the company's
appearance policy was a form of racial discrimination.77 His contention
was that locked hair was a unique hairstyle worn by African-Americans

66. Id.at 260.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 268.
Id.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 268-69.
Id.
Id. at 269.

77. Id. at 262.
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78
and, thus, only this racial group was affected by the policy.

Additionally, he claimed that the application of the policy was having a
greater impact on African-Americans than on any other group. 79
The court rejected both Eatman's disparate treatment and disparate
impact claims. 80 As to disparate treatment, the court found that Eatman
had failed to show that the policy was facially discriminatory. 81

Eatman's own expert had testified that locked hair was not unique to
African-Americans, as other racial groups in other parts of the world
also wore dreadlocks.82 In addition, the court found that Eatman failed to
prove an intent to discriminate because there was no evidence that the
standards were applied differently to employees of other races. 83 The
court concluded that creating reasonable appearance standards for
employees who have contact
with customers was a legitimate
84
responsibility of management.
In reaching its conclusion, the court cited Rogers v. American
Airlines, Inc.85 In Rogers, the employer established a policy that barred
braided hairstyles. 86 Rogers was an African-American woman who held
a position that required contact with the public.8 7 She objected to the
policy because it barred her from wearing her hair in "corn row" style. 88
She claimed that the policy constituted racial discrimination in violation
of the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against involuntary
servitude, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. section 1981.89 In addition, Rogers
also alleged that the policy discriminated against her as a woman. 90
The court rejected the argument that the policy violated the
Thirteenth Amendment, since the plaintiff had the freedom to leave her
job. 91 The court likewise rejected the argument that the policy was a

78.

Id.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 266.
Id. at 264-67.
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id.

84. Id. at 264 (citing Fagan v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1125 (D.C. Cir.
1973)). The court similarly rejected the disparate impact claim because the plaintiff failed to
introduce satisfactory statistical proof that the regulation had a greater impact on black employees.
Id. at 267.
85. 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
86. Id. at 231.
87. Id.
88. Id.

89. Id.
90. Id.
91.

Id.
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form of racial discrimination under Title VII or section 198 1.92 Rogers
had contended that the "corn row" style had special significance to
African-American women and reflected their "cultural, historical
essence." 93 However, the court pointed out that she had not alleged that
only African-Americans wore the hairstyle. 94 In fact, the employer had
stated that Rogers only started wearing the hairstyle after the movie
"10," where a white actress wore a braided hairstyle, had been
released. 95
The court also commented on Eatman's contention that if an
employer banned the "Afro/bush" style, it would violate Title VII and
section 1981.96 The court recognized this argument as a different issue
because the style is a natural one, and particular to African-Americans. 9'
Banning it could be viewed as a regulation of an "immutable
characteristic[]. 98 However, braided hair is not natural. The style can be
changed easily, and there was nothing to prevent Rogers from wearing it
when she was off duty. 99
The court similarly rejected the claim that the policy was a form of
sexual discrimination. 100 The policy applied equally to men and
women. 10' The court reasoned that it is possible for male employees to
have longer hair than women and that these men may prefer to put their
hair in braids. 10 2 The court referred to Willingham and similar cases
dealing with policies on hair length. 0 3 It stated that even a difference in
how the standards applied to men and women would not necessarily
mean that the law had been violated, since this type of policy has a small
impact on the basic concept of equal opportunity. 104
In Hollins v. Atlantic Co.,105 the Sixth Circuit dealt with an
employee's claim that the application of a grooming policy to her
hairstyle constituted racial discrimination. 10 6 The policy stated that
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

id.
Id. at 231-32.
Id. at 232.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 232-33.
Id. at 231.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
188 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 655.
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women's hair needed to be neat and well groomed. 107 The trouble started
when Hollins, who was African-American, began to wear her hair in
"finger waves."10 8 She was told by her foreman that it was too different
and not in compliance with the company's policy. 10 9 Others in
management echoed those comments stating that the style was "eye
catching" and called attention to her.11° Hollins was told that if she
wanted to change her hairstyle she should first submit a picture of it and
get approval from her manager."'
More than a year later, Hollins started wearing a ponytail that
112
management contended was in conflict with the company's standards.
Even a hairstyle that had been previously approved by a manager
113
became a point of contention between the company and1 14Hollins.
These disputes led her to file a claim of racial discrimination.'
The lower court granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment, finding that Hollins had failed to establish a primafacie case
of disparate treatment. 115 The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that
affidavits submitted by Hollins and another female African-American
employee gave rise to a factual dispute as to whether the company's
standards were being applied differently to African-American women as
compared to white female employees. 116 In particular, Hollins contended
that her ponytail was the same as that worn by a number of white
women, who had not been reprimanded, and that only she had been
required to submit pictures of the style in advance of wearing it.11 7 This
factual dispute raised the question of whether
Hollins had been subjected
118
race.
of
because
treatment
to disparate
Hollins stands in contrast to Ali v. Mount Sinai Hospital.119 In Ali,
the court also dealt with a racial discrimination claim by an AfricanAmerican woman who challenged her employer's appearance policy as

107.

Id.

108. Id.
109. Id.
110.

Id.

111.
112.
113.

Id. at 656.
Id.
Id. at 656-57.

114.

Id.

115. Id.
at 657.
116. Id. at 660-61.
117. Id. at 660.
118. Id. at 661.
119. No. 92 Civ. 6129 (JGK) (NG), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8079, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 12,
1996).
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disparate treatment discrimination." 0 While the employer's policy
emphasized the need to present a conservative appearance, the plaintiff's
(Ali's) loud attire and unconventional hair called attention to her. 121 In
Ali's words, her hair was in a "punk" style that she described as an
"Afro hairstyle."' 22 Her supervisor objected to her appearance,
contending it was not in conformance with the company's appearance
policy.123 While Ali claimed the policy was being enforced against her
but not against white female employees, the court here, in contrast to the
court in Hollins, found no evidence to support the claim of unequal
treatment and, thus, granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment. t24
C. Restrictions onfacial hair
Employers frequently include restrictions on facial hair in their
grooming and appearance policies. 125 The policies may be motivated by
what the company managers see as "the needs of the business." A
restaurant chain may perceive a need to make certain that the hair of a
food preparer does not find its way into the "house special." In other
cases, it may need to assure that employees working around dangerous
substances have masks that properly fit and protect them. Some policies
may be created to reinforce an image the company wants its workers to
project to the public.
A number of challenges have been mounted against facial hair
restrictions based on claims of religious discrimination.' 26 In these cases,
the plaintiffs have alleged that having a beard is part of their religious
beliefs, and that the employer is refusing to provide a reasonable
accommodation. 127 In EEOC v. Sambo's of Georgia, Inc., a man applied
for a position as a restaurant manager. 128 His application was rejected
solely because he indicated that, because of the teachings of his religion
(Sikhism), he could not comply with a grooming standard that barred
managers, and other restaurant employees, from having facial hair other

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
See id. at *3-5.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *18-19, *23.
E.g., EEOC v. Sambo's of Ga., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 89 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
E.g., id. at 88.
E.g., id.
Id.
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than a neatly trimmed mustache.1 29 The EEOC contended that 1the
30
employer had failed to provide him with a reasonable accommodation.
The court rejected the Commission's argument. 131 It found that "no
beard" policies were common in the restaurant industry and that the
employer had not granted exceptions in the past.1 32 The employer's
experience indicated that customers prefer restaurants where managers
are clean-shaven.' 33 The presence of beards raises customer concerns
regarding sanitary conditions within the restaurant.134 The court also
noted that the guidelines established by the state indicated that excessive
facial hair could be considered a violation of state regulations. 135 Given
the low threshold established in Hardison, granting an accommodation
to the claimant would involve significant
cost to the employer and, thus,
36
would constitute an undue hardship. 1
In Bhatia v. Chevron US.A., Inc.,' 3 7 the Ninth Circuit heard from
another follower of the Sikh religion. 38 There, the employer established
a policy requiring that all employees who could potentially be exposed
to toxic gases be clean-shaven, so that the masks used to protect them
from possible gas leaks would be tight fitting. 139 The policy had been
created to comply with a state safety regulation. 40 Employees who
refused to comply with the company's policy were fired.141
When the plaintiff (Bhatia) told the company he could not comply
with the policy because of his religious beliefs, he was suspended
without pay. 142 The company then processed an application for transfer
to a similar position where Bhatia would not be required to wear a
mask. 143 After a fruitless search, the company offered Bhatia other
positions, at a lower pay rate, and promised he would be allowed to
return to his old position if new safety equipment was developed that

129. Id. at 88-89.
130. Id. at 90.
131.

Id.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 89.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 90-91 (citing TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977)).
734 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1383.
Id.

140.
141.

Id.
Id.

142. Id.
143. Id.
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would both cover his beard and protect him from gas leaks. 144 Initially
Bhatia refused the offers, but ultimately took a janitorial job with a pay
rate below what he had been paid in his original position. 145
The court recognized that Bhatia's religious beliefs had caused his
removal and that, as a result, he had established a primafacie case of
religious discrimination. 146 However, the employer was able to mount a
successful defense by showing that allowing Bhatia to stay in his
original machinist job would create an undue hardship given that the
company would be in violation of state safety regulations. 147 The
company's willingness to look for other jobs for Bhatia, and its promise
to return him to his job if appropriate protective gear was later created,
demonstrated the employer's accommodation efforts. 14 8 This was
something the company had not done for other employees
whose refusal
49
to shave was not motivated by a religious belief. 1
In other cases, plaintiffs have enjoyed some measure of success in
challenging company policies on beards that create conflict with
religious beliefs.150 In Carterv. Bruce Oakley, Inc., the plaintiff (Carter)
was constructively discharged because of his refusal to comply with the
requirement that his beard be kept trim. 151 Carter claimed that his
religious beliefs (Judaism) prohibited him from complying. 152 The
employer contended that wearing a beard was not required by Carter's
religion. 153 While the court conceded that Carter's beliefs did not fit
neatly into Judaism, they were based on scripture and were beliefs that
he sincerely held. 154 Thus, Carter met the first requirement for
establishing a primafacie case of religious discrimination. 155 The second
and third requirements were met as well, when Carter showed that he
had informed the employer of the conflict between his beliefs and the

144. Id.
145. Id.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id.

149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Carter v. Bruce Oakley, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 673, 673 (E.D. Ark. 1993).
151. Id. at 676. Due to a shortage of workers with the plaintiff's skills, the employer indicated
that it would waive its no-beard policy for him if he returned to work. Shortly after his return, the
company demanded that he trim the beard in a manner that the plaintiff claimed was contrary to his
religious beliefs. Id. at 674.
152. Id. at 673.
153. Id. at 674.
154. Id. at 674-75.
155. Id. at 675.
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policy, and that the conflict ultimately resulted in his dismissal.156
The court examined whether an undue hardship would be created
for the employer if a reasonable accommodation were offered to the
plaintiff.1 57 Compelling to the court was the fact that the employer had
difficulty articulating reasons why Carter should be denied the right to
wear a beard. 158 The company's contention that it was unsafe, because
workers sometimes had to wear protective masks, was rebutted by
Carter's testimony that his beard actually helped the mask fit better.' 151
60
Nor did the court find that Carter's appearance was "unprofessional."'
Rather, the beard was short to moderate in length. 16 1 Thus, the court
concluded that allowing Carter to wear a beard would not create an
undue hardship for the employer and
that Carter should have been
162
offered a reasonable accommodation.
In EEOC v. UPS,163 the employer's policy barred employees in
public contact positions from having a beard. 164
Aiyub Patel was a parttime employee with a beard that was permitted because his position did
not require public contact.165 However, when he had enough seniority,
under the company's bargaining agreement with the union, he applied
for a public contact position as a delivery-driver. 166 However, as a
follower of Islam, Patel refused to comply with the no beard policy and,
consequently, the company denied him the new position. 67 The
employer was willing to allow him to be considered for full-time
positions that did not require public contact, but contended that Patel
was not interested in these accommodations. 168
The EEOC challenged the company's decision, arguing that the
employer had not offered Patel a reasonable accommodation. 169 While
the trial court granted the employer summary judgment, concluding that
the offer of a non-contact position provided a reasonable

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.

161.

Id.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.

Id. at 675-76.
Id.
Id. at 676.

Id.

94 F.3d 314 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 315.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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accommodation, the Seventh Circuit reversed. 170 It found that summary
judgment was not appropriate because a conflict existed between the
parties as to the material facts of the case.171 Further, it rejected the
employer's contention that the offer, of a substitute full-time position72
where there was no public contact, was a reasonable accommodation. 1
The court rejected the employer's contention that an acceptable
accommodation had been offered because management admitted that, at
the time, there was no such position available to Patel because of his
lack of seniority, and that it was possible that he would not become
eligible for such a position for two years or longer. 173 In light of the fact
that the non-public contact position was currently unavailable, the
proposed accommodation hardly seemed reasonable. 174
"No beard" policies have also been challenged as being a form of
racial discrimination. 175 Many African-American men suffer from
pseudofolliculitis barbae (PFB), which is a painful skin condition that
almost exclusively affects this group. 176 For those afflicted, it is difficult,
or even impossible, to shave. 7 7 If an employer strictly enforces a "no
beard" policy, it may effectively deny these men the chance for
employment.
In Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., an African-American employee
was terminated by a retail grocery store when he grew a beard in
violation of a policy that barred facial hair, except for short
mustaches. 1 8 The plaintiff (Woods) had grown the beard on the advice
of his dermatologist who felt it might help treat his PFB. 179 Woods
claimed that since the condition almost exclusively affected AfricanAmerican men, the policy was based on racially tainted criteria. 8 0
The Woods court recognized that a neutral policy, that significantly
and adversely affects one racial group, could be the basis of a racial
discrimination claim. 181 However, it also indicated that the employer

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175,
176.
(4th Cir.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181

Id. at 320-21.
Id.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 319-20.
Id.
E.g., EEOC v. UPS, 860 F.2d 372, 373 (10th Cir. 1988).
Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 35, 37 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd, 579 F.2d 43
1978).
UPS, 860 F.2d at 373.
Woods, 420 F. Supp. at37 & n.2.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 42.
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could defend itself by showing the policy is based on a legitimate
business purpose. 182 The court ultimately accepted the employer's
contention that in the very competitive retail grocery business, it is
important that the store, and its employees, convey an image of
cleanliness in order to attract customers, and that some people hold the
view that beards are unclean. 183 In upholding the right of the employer to
establish this policy, the court found that the impact in this case had been
slight, since it appeared that only the plaintiff had been adversely
affected.1 84 Additionally, there was no evidence that the standard was
and the employer had no history
created with the intent to discriminate,
1 85
discrimination.
practicing
of
While the court in Woods showed a willingness to defer to the
judgment of the employer, as it related to an understanding of customer
preferences, the Eighth Circuit was not willing to defer in Bradley v.
Pizzaco of Nebraska, Inc.186 In this case, the plaintiff, who suffered from
PFB, was fired as a delivery man for a franchisor of Domino's Pizza
because he violated the ban on beards that had been established
nationwide by Domino's.1 87 A vice president of Domino's testified that
it was common sense that the better Domino's employees looked, the
better sales would be.' 88 In addition, the vice president cited a public
opinion survey that showed that twenty percent of those surveyed would
react negatively to a bearded deliveryman.1 89
The court looked with skepticism on using customer preference as a
basis for arguing business necessity absent evidence that customers
would actually order less pizza because of bearded deliverymen.' 90 It
pointed out that its decision did not bar Domino's from enforcing its no
beard policy for those who did not suffer from the skin condition. 91 It
also affirmed the company's right to require those who had to grow
beards because of the condition to keep them neatly trimmed, not
exceeding a specified length.' 92

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id.
7 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 796.
Id. at 798.
Id.
at 799.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In EEOC v. Trailways, Inc.,'93 a district court also rejected an
employer's "no beard" policy that applied to drivers and other workers
in public contact positions.194 The policy caused a number of AfricanAmerican men who suffered from PFB to lose their jobs. 195 The
difference between this case and Bradley was that the employer offered96
no argument of business necessity to rebut the disparate impact claim. 197
Instead, the employer relied on EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,'
which held that a "no beard" policy did not violate Title VII. 198
However, the judge in Trailways concluded that the defendant had
misread the scope of the Third Circuit's decision in Greyhound.199
There, the court was dealing with circumstances where the EEOC had
failed to introduce evidence to show the disparate impact of the policy
on African-Americans. °° In Trailways, the court pointed out that there
was no such failure. 20 1 Evidence from the Commission demonstrated
that PFB almost exclusively affected African-American men and that the
employer's policy would exclude roughly a quarter of them from being
employed in public contact positions. 0 2
In Trailways, the court found no justification for the disparate
impact claim since the employer had failed to show any business need
for the rule. 20 3 However, as in Bradley, the court indicated that its
finding did not prevent the employer from establishing a general no
beard policy, so long as an exception was permitted for those suffering
from PFB. 204 Those with the condition could be required to have neat
and trim beards.20 5
D. Policies Regulating Dress
Employers regulate the clothing of employees for a number of
reasons. If an employee has contact with the public, an employer may

193.
194.

530 F. Supp. 54 (D. Colo. 1981).
Id. at 55, 59 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).

195.

Id. at 56.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 57.
635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980).
Trailways, 530 F. Supp. at 57.
Id. (quoting Greyhound Lines, 635 F.2d at 190 n.3).
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 55, 59 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
204. Id. at 59.
205. Id.
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want to make certain that the employee's attire projects a certain image
for the business. A financial institution or an office of professionals may
want to create a conservative image. On the other hand, a clothing store
that targets teenaged customers may want employees to dress in a
manner that reflects current trends. In other instances, uniforms bring a
standardization that allows customers and supervisors to identify
employees.
Even if an employee is not in contact with the public, an employer
may want to regulate dress to discourage attire that it considers overly
provocative, or otherwise disruptive of the performance of other
workers. Dress deemed inappropriate may, in the judgment of managers,
be too sexually revealing or too reflective of the wearer's political or
religious beliefs. If an employee challenges clothing regulations, the
employer typically confronts issues relating to discrimination due to
gender, race, or religion.20 6
In Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, a female
employee brought an action challenging a dress code that she claimed
discriminated against women.2 °7 In particular, she objected to a policy
requiring female employees to wear uniforms, while male employees
performing the same jobs were allowed to wear customary business
clothing. 20 8 The lower court granted the employer's motion for summary
policy did not prevent equal
judgment, finding that the employer's
20 9
employment opportunity for women.
The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that under section 703(a)(1)
the employer had discriminated as to compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment because of such individual's sex. 2'0 The court
stated that there had been discrimination in compensation because the
uniforms given to the female employees were considered income, which
required the employer to withhold income tax from their pay which, of
211
course, was not done for the men. In addition, if the uniform was

206. E.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 1029 (7th Cir.
1979); Davis v. Mothers Work, Inc., CIV. A. No. 04-3943, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15890, at *1
(E.D. Penn. Aug. 4, 2005).
207. Carroll,604 F.2d at 1029.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1033. Section 703(a)(1) provides that it is an unlawful employment practice for an
employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge . . . or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)
(2000).
211.

Carroll,604 F.2d at 1030.
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damaged, the female employee had to pay for a replacement uniform.21 2
A second finding in the court's decision was that requiring only
women to wear uniforms was demeaning to the women. 2 3 The court
stated that it is assumed that those wearing uniforms are of a lower
professional status than those who are not, and found that the employer's
policy was based on offensive stereotyping.214
In Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,215 a male employee claimed
sexual discrimination after he was terminated for not complying with a
rule requiring that he wear a tie on the job, something not required of
female employees. 216 He claimed discrimination because when female
employees had earlier violated a policy requiring them to wear skirts, not
only were they not disciplined, but the company also changed its policy
the plaintiff, these events
to allow women to wear slacks.217 To 218
represented unequal treatment based on sex..
The court rejected both arguments. 219 First, the court found that
there was substantial precedent for allowing an employer to establish
different dress standards for men and women. 220 Second, it found that an
employer had the right to amend the dress code over time to reflect
changes in the image that the company wanted to project. 22' The fact that
the company had failed to discipline the female employees for their
violations and had also amended the policy to meet the women's
objections, was interpreted by the court as a reflection that the
company's judgment about acceptable attire for female employees had
changed. The right to amend the regulations for one gender, and not
the other, flows from the right an employer has to create separate

212.

Id. The dissent found the majority's position to be nit-picking, given that male employees

had to pay the full price when they bought clothing for work and did not receive a tax deduction. Id.
at 1038. In addition, ifa male employee's clothing was damaged, he had to pay for that loss just as a
female employee would. Id.
213. Id. at 1032-33.
214. Id. at 1033; see also O'Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp.
263, 266 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (relying on Carrollto find discrimination because of a requirement that

female employees wear a smock over their clothing, while male employees performing the same job
were allowed to wear a shirt and tie).
215. 555 F.2d753 (9thCir. 1977).
216. Id. at 754-55.
217. Id. at 755.
218. Id. at 756.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 755-56.
221. Id. at 756.
222. Id.
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appearance regulations for men and women.223
What happens when an employer has no written policy governing
particular clothing that an employee must wear that differentiates
between male and female employees? In Craft v. Metromedia, Inc.,224 a
television station demoted a female news anchor after receiving results
from focus groups and a telephone survey of the station's target
audience.225 The survey attempted to measure the audience's view of the
plaintiff (Craft) versus other female news anchors working for
competing stations. 22 6 It showed that Craft was trailing the other female
anchors in almost every category.227 Four of the categories related to
"good looks," clothing, and image of a female anchor.228 According to
Craft, part of the evidence of discrimination included surveys regarding
male on-air personalities that were different from the female surveys in
that the male surveys did not attempt to measure "appearance" in the
same way as for the female employees. 229
Part of Craft's sexual discrimination claim related to what she
argued was the more stringent appearance standards that the company
applied to female on-air personnel.2 30 The evidence showed that soon
after Craft was hired the station began to have concerns about her
clothing and makeup. 231 The news director began to make suggestions
and criticisms regarding her clothing. 232 Eventually, the station arranged
with Macy's to provide a fashion consultant and clothing for Craft.233
In addition, the plaintiff introduced the testimony of other female
employees who opined that the employer placed more emphasis on the
appearance of female employees.234 The record reflected that the station
had hired Craft to try to soften the image of its news presentation that, in
part, was to be accomplished through a wardrobe that emphasized a
feminine touch replete with "bows and ruffles. 2 35 She was also

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1209.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1214.
Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1208.
Id.
Id. at 1208-09.
Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1214.
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236
cautioned against wearing clothes that were too tight fitting or "sexy.1
Craft was told to wait at least three weeks before wearing the same outfit
on camera again, while the men were allowed to wear the same suit
twice in one week so long as it was with a different tie.237
The trial court rejected Craft's claim of sex discrimination.23 8 It
found that the television station required both men and women in on-air
roles to maintain a professional appearance, and that the enforcement of
this objective was done in a nondiscriminatory manner.239 In
contradiction to the evidence introduced by Craft, the Eighth Circuit
pointed out that the lower court had evidence before it that indicated the
men were also subjected to scrutiny of their appearance.240 One man was
told to get better fitting clothing, to refrain from wearing sweaters under
jackets, and to tie neckties in a certain manner.241 Other men had been
told to lose weight, to get a hairpiece, and to start wearing contact
lenses.242
The Court of Appeals found that there was no evidence in the
record that the trial court had acted in a clearly erroneous fashion.243
While the appellate court felt that the station had overemphasized the
issue of appearance, it held that the station had not done so in a
discriminatory manner.24 It accepted the lower court's conclusion that
"'appearance" is critical to a business whose economic success is so tied
245
to a visual medium.
In Schmitz v. ING Securities, Futures & Options, Inc.,246 the
plaintiff (Schmitz) brought a sexual harassment suit after she had been
terminated for poor work performance.247 She claimed the real reason
behind her termination was that she had complained about sexually
harassing behavior. 248 The behavior under critique related to repeated
criticisms made by a manager about the inappropriateness of the clothing

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See id.at1215.
Id.at 1214.
Id. at 1207-08.
Id. at 1209-10.
See id. at 1213.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1216.
Id. at 1215-16.
Id. at 1215.
No. 98-3007, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16942, at *1 (7th Cir. July 20, 1999).
Id. at *4.
Id.
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she wore. 24 9 He criticized Schmitz for having skirts or blouses that were
too tight or too revealing.2 50 Schmitz acknowledged that she wore skirts
that were five or six inches above her knees. 251 The manager complained
to her that her clothing left little to the imagination and was so
provocative that any "hot-blooded male" would be aroused by her
appearance. 2 He claimed that this type of attire was disrupting office
productivity.253 Female supervisors who worked for the company agreed
with the thrust of his criticisms.254
While the court did not specifically deal with the issue of the
employer's right to have managers regulate the dress of subordinates, it
found that Schmitz had failed to make a case for sexual harassment that
was attributable to a hostile work environment. 5 In particular, she had
the duty to show that she was subject to unwelcome sexual advances or
requests for sexual favors or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature. a According to the court, Schmitz was unconvincing on this
point.257 There was no evidence of improper sexual advances.258 The
court stated that harassment is not proven just because words have a
sexual connotation.' 59
On the other hand, employers can be liable for requiring female
2 60
employees to wear clothing that subjects them to sexual harassment.
In EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., a woman had been required to wear a
uniform that she claimed was too revealing and led to her being
subjected to lewd remarks and sexual propositions. 26 The court's review
of photographs of the employee in her uniform led to a finding that the
uniform was "short, revealing and sexually provocative., 262 The court
concluded that a prima facie case had been established that she was
subjected to sexual harassment because of her employer's

249. Id. at *2.
250. Id.
251.

Id.

252. Id. at *3.
253. Id.
254. Id. at *9.
255. See id. at *12-13.
256. Id. at *6 (citing Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir.
1998)).
257. Id. at *7.
258. Id.
259. Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998); Shepherd
v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999)).
260. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 610-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
261. Id.at 605.
262. Id. at 607.
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requirement.263 Since her employer failed to introduce any legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the requirement, it violated Title VII.264
In Davis v. Mothers Work, Inc., an African-American plaintiff
(Davis) contended that her employer's enforcement of its dress code
constituted both racial and religious discrimination. 65 The store's policy
required employees to wear "clothing that reflects the current in-store
seasonal fashions. 266 While exactly what transpired between Davis and
the company's district manager was in dispute, what was clear was that
the district manager did not approve of the full-length robe and
headscarf that Davis wore as part of her Muslim religion.267 According
to Davis, this led the manager to tell her to leave work and go home. 68
Although the manager relented and allowed Davis to return to work
with her over-garment, Davis contended that the manager demonstrated
an unwillingness to accept her appearance. 269 Davis charged that the
manager monitored her work more closely than before, and that she was
subject to rude comments and "nasty looks" from the manager. 270 In
addition, her work schedule was changed, creating a conflict with the
second job she held. 271 Finally, the reason the company used to terminate
Davis was that she did not show up for a scheduled day of work.272 In
her defense, Davis claimed that it was a day when she was not originally
scheduled to work and that the scheduling change was never
communicated to her.273
The court allowed Davis' claims to survive the defendant's motion
for summary judgment.274 As to the charge of racial discrimination, the
court concluded that Davis had established a prima facie case because
she contended that a white employee, who did not conform to the
company's dress code, had not been subject to the same treatment.2 75
Davis argued that the reason given for her termination was a pretext, and

263.

Id. at 607-08.

264. Id. at 608, 613.
265. Davis v. Mothers Work, Inc., CIV. A. No. 04-3943, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15890, at *15 (E.D. Penn. Aug. 4, 2005).

266. Id. at *4.
267.

See id. at *4-5.

268. Id. at *5.
269. See id. at *6.
270.
271.

Id.
Id. at*6-7.

272.

Id. at *8.

273.
274.
275.

Id. at*21-22.
Id. at*41.
Id. at *15-17.
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that the dismissal was really attributable to her race.276
Similarly, Davis introduced sufficient evidence on her religious
discrimination case to survive the motion for summary judgment. 277 She
argued that she was treated differently than other employees because she
wore religious attire. 278
In other claims of religious discrimination, it has not been the
clothing worn, but symbols or words adorning the dress of an employee
that have raised controversy.279 In Wilson v. U.S. West Communications,
an employee (Wilson) wore an anti-abortion button on her clothing that
depicted a fetus. 280 The graphic nature of the pin led to controversy with
other workers who objected to it and complained to management.2 81
While the company did not have a dress policy, it informed Wilson that
because the pin was upsetting other workers and affecting their
productivity, she would not be allowed to wear it outside of her work
cubicle.282 The company tried to offer her a number of accommodations,
each of which she refused because she claimed that they would require
her to ignore her religious beliefs.283 The Eighth Circuit upheld Wilson's
termination, finding that her religious beliefs did not require that she
wear that particular pin, and that the employer had extended her a
number of reasonable accommodations.284
A similar issue arose in Rivera v. Choice CourierSystems, Inc.2 85 In
that case, an employee (Rivera) delivered mail and answered phones at
clients' businesses. 86 The employer had a dress code that it considered
important in projecting the professional image of its employees. 287
Rivera attached badges to his work clothes that reflected his religious
beliefs.288 One of the clients contacted the employer to express
"concern" about the badges.289 Subsequently, Rivera was told not to
wear them. 29 Rivera indicated he could not comply with this direction
276. Id. at *21-23.
277. Id. at *25, *41.
278. Id. at *25.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

See, e.g., Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc'ns., 58 F.3d 1337, 1338 (8th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1339.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1341-42.
No. 01 Civ. 2096 (CBM), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11758, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2004).
Id. at*1-2.
Id. at *2.

288.

Id. at *4.

289.

Id.

290. Id. at *5.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

27

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

208

[Vol. 24:181

because of his religious beliefs and he was subsequently terminated.2 9'
Due to a conflict in the contentions of the parties, as to whether he had
been offered a reasonable accommodation and whether such was even
possible given his intransigence, the court did not grant summary
judgment.292
E. Jewelry and Cosmetic Appearance
Companies have also sought to regulate the wearing of jewelry and
cosmetics by their employees while on the job. Such policies are usually
motivated by managers' desire to make certain that the appearance of an
employee is acceptable to the public. As suggested in Schmitz, the
appearance of an employee may be seen as affecting the performance of
other workers.293
In Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,294 an employer instituted a
dress code barring employees from wearing facial jewelry, with the
exception of earrings.295 Cloutier wore a ring in her pierced eyebrow.2 96
When she was approached about violating the policy, she refused to
comply indicating that the ring was worn as a reflection of her religious
beliefs.297 The employer offered her the accommodations of either
wearing a plastic retainer or a band-aid over the jewelry.298 Cloutier
rejected both offers, claiming that her religious beliefs required that her
facial piercing be on display at all times.299
When the employer terminated Cloutier's employment, she filed
suit, claiming that the company failed to meet its obligation to
reasonably accommodate her religious beliefs.3 °0 After bringing suit in
federal court, under both Title VII and state law, the employer filed a
motion for summary judgment, which the lower court granted, finding
that the employer had offered Cloutier a reasonable accommodation.30 1
In affirming the lower court's decision, the First Circuit based its

291. Id. at *6.
292. Id. at *31.
293.

See Schmitz v. ING Secs., Futures & Options, Inc., No. 98-3007, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS

16942, at *3 (7th Cir. July 20, 1999).
294. 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004).
295. Id. at 129.

296. Id.
297.

Id.

298. Id. at 130.
299.
300.
301.

Id.
Id. at 128, 130.
Id. at 130-32.
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decision on the finding that the employer could not accommodate
Cloutier, in a way she found reasonable, without undue hardship.3 °2 In
particular, the court pointed out that the appearance of employees
reflects on their employers.30 3 This is especially true of employees who,
like Cloutier, were in public contact positions. 304 The employer
successfully argued that Cloutier's facial jewelry detracted from the
image it wanted to project to its customers, and that requiring it to grant
an exemption from the policy, which was essentially all that Cloutier
would accept, would adversely affect that image.30 5
Beyond employee claims that policies governing appearance may
violate Title VII, employers must also be concerned with state or local
laws that provide employees with broader protections.30 6 Such was the
30 7
case in Sam's Club, Inc. v. Madison Equal OpportunitiesCommission.
There, the state court had to interpret a city ordinance that, in part,
prohibited discrimination in employment based on "physical
appearance. 308 The ordinance included policies that pertained to
hairstyles, beards, dress, weight, facial features, and other aspects of
appearance. 30 9 The ordinance contained an exception when the
employer's regulations were based on cleanliness, uniforms, or
prescribed attire, so long as the standards were uniformly applied and
were for a reasonable business purpose.3 10
In this case, as in Costco, the employee had a loop through her
311
eyebrow that violated the company's policy barring facial jewelry.
The employer argued that the policy was motivated by its desire to
promote a "traditional" or "conservative" style of appearance, and that it
did not want employees to have a "flashy" appearance that would be
distracting to customers.312 The company's expert testified that the
wearing of facial jewelry was not consistent with the conservative image
that the employer wanted to convey to its customers.3 13

302. Id. at 132.
303. Id. at 135.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See, e.g., Sam's Club, Inc. v.Madison Equal Opportunities Comm'n,No. 02-2024, 2003
WL 21707207, at*1(Wisc.Ct. App. July 24, 2003).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. (quoting MADISON, WISC., MADISON GENERAL ORDINANCE, § 3.23(2)(bb) (1998)).
310. Id. (quoting MADISON, WISC., MADISON GENERAL ORDINANCE, § 3.23(2)(bb) (1998)).
311. Id.
312. Id.

313. Id.at*2.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

29

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 1
210

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 24:181

The city's commission adopted the hearing examiner's findings that
the policy, designed to promote a conservative image, was not based on
a reasonable business purpose and that the employee's discharge
violated the city's ordinance.314 The lower court reversed the
commission's finding. 15
The appellate court affirmed the lower court.31 6 It found that one
business might have a very different idea than another, in terms of the
image that it wants its employees to convey to the public. 31 7 One
business may want to appear as "trendy," allowing employees freedom
in terms of appearance. 31 8 However, Sam's Club wanted to project a "no
frills, no flash" look for its employees.31 9 Prohibiting facial jewelry was
consistent with that objective320 and, thus, the regulation was for a
"reasonable business purpose.,
In DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. 321 the Ninth
Circuit consolidated three district court decisions, all of which related 3to
22
the question of whether homosexuals were protected under Title VII.
In one of the cases, a male employee had been terminated from his
position in a nursery school because he wore a small ear-loop. 323 He
contended that he was terminated because the school relied on a
stereotype that dictated that men must have a virile appearance, and that
the school viewed the earring as effeminate.324 The lower court's
dismissal of his Title VII claim, holding that protection from sexual
discrimination applied only to an individual's gender and should not be
extended to include sexual preference, was affirmed by the appellate
court. 325

This case did not raise the traditional claim of unequal treatment
because of gender. In addition, social norms have changed regarding
men wearing earrings since the time when the case was decided. 326
314. Id.

315. Id. at*3.
316. Id. at*16.
317. Id. at*14.
318. Id.
319. Id. at *15.
320. Id. at*15-16.
321. 608 F.2d 327 (9thCir. 1979).
322. Id. at328.
323. Id.
324. Id. at331.
325. Id. at331-32.
326. See generally Michael Winerip, Our Towns; New Male Rite of Passage: Getting an Ear
Pierced, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1986, §1, at 148 (discussing society's growing acceptance of men
wearing earrings).
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However, given the latitude that the courts have given to employers in
creating distinctions in appearance policies for men and women, it seems
likely that in a case where conservative appearance is considered an
important aspect of a position, an employer can make a valid argument
that it should have a right to allow women but not men to wear earrings.
A controversy arose in Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co.,327
regarding the right of a business to establish different cosmetic standards
for men and women. A casino had established appearance standards
for its bartenders that distinguished on the basis of gender in several
ways. 3 29 For example, the length of male employees' hair was regulated
and, while the women's was not, women were required to have hair that
was teased, curled or styled, and worn down. 330 Men had to have clean
and neatly trimmed nails, with no colored polish, while women were
told that their nails could only be covered by certain colors, and could
not contain either exotic art or be of exotic length.3 3'
Jespersen had been employed with the company for twenty years
and objected to the appearance standard that required female employees
to wear make-up, claiming that it conflicted with her self-image, and
was demeaning and degrading to women. 332 She further argued that it
imposed a greater burden on women.333 Jespersen contended that the
policy violated Title VII because men were not subject to the same terms
and conditions of employment that were imposed on women.334 Her
second argument was that, under the rationale used by the Supreme
Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,335 the employer was engaged in
impermissible sexual stereotyping.336
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's grant of summary
judgment to the employer.33 7 As to Jespersen's claim that the
requirement placed a time and expense burden on women that was not
327. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
328. Id. at 1105-06.
329. Id. at 1107.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.at 1106-08.
333. Seeid. atlllO.
334. Id.at 1108.
335. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In Hopkins, the employer did not promote a female employee,
Hopkins, to partner, at least in part, because her aggressive behavior marked her as not being
feminine enough. See id. at 233-35. Yet, the firm recognized that her aggressive behavior
(stereotypical of men) was important to her success. See id. at 234. The Court found that this could
create a Catch-22 for Hopkins. Id. at 251.
336. See Jespersen,444 F.3dat l108,1111.
337. Id.at1106.
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placed on men, the court held that not every difference in grooming
policies constitutes illegal sex discrimination.338 In addition, the court
determined that Jespersen had failed to introduce
evidence that the
339
women.
on
burdensome
more
were
standards
The court also rejected Jespersen's contention that the employer's
conduct constituted illegal stereotyping under Price Waterhouse.340 In
Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff (Hopkins) had essentially been told that
to achieve a promotion she needed to tone down characteristics that
seemed more masculine and to act more femininely. 34' In Jespersen, the
court did not believe that Harrah's standards interfered with the
plaintiffs ability to do her job in the way that Price Waterhouse's
standards interfered with Hopkin's ability to do her job.342 The court
went on to say that while it was possible that a grooming standard could
constitute sexual stereotyping, most of the standards there were applied
equally to men and women, did not appear to be motivated by
stereotypical thinking, and were reasonable.343
In another case, a public employer was sued when an employee was
terminated, in part, because of her failure to conform to her supervisor's
expectations as to what constituted an appropriate appearance.
In
particular, she had been reprimanded, and later terminated, for wearing
excessive makeup and wearing her hair down.345 In that case, Wislocki346
Goin v. Mears, there was no written dress or appearance policy.
However, the employer-judge, who was responsible for overseeing the
performance of employees, expected her subordinates to maintain an
appearance that would conform to a "Brooks Brothers look., 347 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's rejection of the plaintiff's
disparate treatment claim because she failed to show that the supervisor
treated male employees more leniently. 348 She also failed to show that
the stated reason for her discharge was a pretext for discrimination.3 49

338. See id. at 1109-10.
339. Id.
at I111.
340. Id. at 1113.
341. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
342. Jespersen, 444 F.2d at 1113.
343. Id.
344. Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1376-77 (7th Cir. 1987).

345.

Id.
at 1377.

346.
347.
348.

Id. at 1376.
Id.
Id. at 1378, 1382.

349. Id. at 1379.
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The plaintiffs disparate impact claim was also rejected.350 She
failed to show that the supervisor's desire to have the staff maintain a
professional appearance in their dealings with the public was not a
legitimate interest. 35 In addition, there was no evidence that the
application of the appearance policies created a greater hardship for
female employees.352
F. Policies Controlling Weight
Some businesses have created policies to regulate the weight of
their employees; their reasons vary. One reason may be that if an
employee exceeds certain weight limits, he or she will not be able to
perform one of the functions of the position. For example, the airlines
have established weight limitations for flight attendants, at least in part,
because occasionally the attendant must be able to access, in very
limited space, a passenger suffering from some type of physical
distress.353 In other instances, employers may want weight limitations
because of the high correlation between weight, medical costs, and
absenteeism. 354
Employers may also be interested in regulating the appearance of
employees who are dealing with the public.355 When weight restrictions
lead to employer actions that adversely affect employees, challenges
have been mounted under a variety of statutes, including Title VII,3 56 the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),357 the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,358 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 359 as
350. Id. at 1382.
351. Id. at 1380 (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,329 (1977)).
352. Id.
353. See Leonard v. Nat'l Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 269, 274-75 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (holding
that the airline's weight policy reached the twin objectives of safety and service); see also Dennis
M. Lynch, The Heavy Issue: Weight-Based Discriminationin the Airline Industry, 62 J. AIR L. &
COM. 203, 212 (1996) (discussing the airlines justification of height and weight requirements on the
basis of safety).
354. Employee

Obesity

Costs Company, Other

Workers

Money,

SMALL

BUSINESS

ADVANTAGE, September 2005, http://www.sbtimes.com/articles/05/09/6.shtml.
355. Lynch, supra note 353, at 212 (citing Toni S. Reed, Comment, FlightAttendant Furies:Is
Title VII Really the Solution to Hiring Policy Problems, 58 J. AIR L. & COM. 267, 290 (1992);
Pamela Whitesides, Flight Attendant Weight Policies: A Title VII Wrong Without a Remedy, 64 S.
CAL. L. REV. 175, 198 (1990)).
356. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
357. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
358. 29 U.S.C §§ 701-7961 (2000). Like the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act was designed to
protect those that meet the definition of being disabled; however, the reach of the law is not as
broad, as it applies only to those who receive federal funds or are government contractors, federal
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3 60
well as various state or local laws.
Those disciplined or denied employment because of weight have
frequently invoked the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.361 To
proceed to the question of whether a person has been a victim of
discrimination, under either statute, the employee must first establish
that he qualifies as "disabled. 3 62 The ADA provides the claimant with
three possible ways of satisfying this requirement.363 The individual can
either show that he has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially affects one or more major life activities, that he has had a
history of an impairment that affects major life activities, or that the
employer regarded him as disabled. 3
In Coleman v. Georgia Power Co.,365 the plaintiff (Coleman) was
discharged because of his failure to meet weight limitations that applied
to his position.366 The requirement was established because the position
could require the operation of a lift device that had an operator weight
limit attached to it by its manufacturer.367
The court concluded that Coleman was not disabled under any of
the definitions included under the ADA. 368 The court relied on EEOC
regulations stating that only in rare cases would obesity be considered a
disability. 369 While there was evidence that he qualified as being
morbidly obese, there was no evidence that tied his condition to a
physiological disorder or condition, as required under EEOC
regulations.37 °

executive agencies or the U.S. Postal Service. See id. § 701(b), (c); see also U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/ofccp/
fs503.htm (last visited May 16, 2007) (explaining the basic provisions and scope of the Act).
359. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2000).
360. E.g., N.Y. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW § 291 (2003).
361. E.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 2000) (claiming a
violation of the ADA when an employer rejected an applicant because of his weight); Tudyman v.
United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 740 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (claiming that the employer airline violated
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 when the employer rejected an applicant because of their weight).
362. See Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 283 (2d Cir. 1997).
363. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
364. Id.
365. 81 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
366. Id. at 1367.
367. Id. at 1366.
368. Id. at 1370.
369. Id. at 1368 (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1997)).
370. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(h) (1991)). Under EEOC regulations, a

physical impairment includes "[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement,
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular,
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The court also found that Coleman did not qualify under the second
prong of the definition because he failed to show that he had a history
demonstrating that his obese condition substantially limited major life
activities. 371 Nor did he qualify under the third criterion since the record
did not include evidence that his employer regarded
him as having a
372
substantial impairment of a major life activity.
However, the First Circuit, in Cook v. Rhode IslandDepartment of
Mental Health, Retardation, & Hospitals, 373 found that the plaintiffs
(Cook's) morbid obesity qualified her as being disabled under the
Rehabilitation Act.374 Unlike in Coleman, the court concluded that the
jury, which had found for Cook, could conclude, based on the evidence,
that her condition met the EEOC's definition of disability. 375 In

particular, the jury could conclude that Cook's condition was attributable
to a "metabolic
dysfunction" that was tied to a "physiological
376
disorder.

In Cook, the nurse who conducted the pre-hire physical had found
that Cook was morbidly obese but had not concluded that her weight
would affect her ability to do the job. 377 However, the employer rejected
Cook because it believed her condition would prevent her from doing
some of the tasks included in the job.378 The employer's supervisor also
believed that the condition would lead to a higher rate of absenteeism
and a greater risk that she would file workers compensation claims.379
Cook prevailed, not based on the theory that she suffered from a
disability that substantially affected major life activities, but on her
contention that the employer perceived her as disabled. 380 The evidence
before the jury allowed it to conclude that the employer believed she was
disabled. 38 The court stated that the fact that the employer's belief may
have been formed in "good faith" was no defense.382 In addition, even if
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin and endocrine." 29. C.F.R. §
1630.2(h)(1) (2006).
371. Coleman, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1371.
372. Id. (citing Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1327 n.2 (11 th Cir. 1998)).
373. 10 F.3d 17 (lst Cir. 1993).

374. Id. at 28.
375. Id. at 23.
376. Id. at 24.
377.
378.
379.

Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 21.
Id.

380. Id. at 23.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 26-27 (citing Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981);
Carter v. Casa Cent., 849 F.2d 1048, 1056 (7th Cir. 1998)).
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the employer was correct in thinking that Cook would miss more work
than the average employee due to her condition, or that she was more
likely to file workers compensation claims, those reasons provided no
defense.383 The "reasonable accommodation" duty of the statute required
the employer to accept such a burden when dealing with a disabled
employee. 3
Another challenge to weight standards was mounted by female
flight attendants in Frank v. United Airlines, Inc.385 This suit involved
claims under Title VII, the ADEA and the ADA.386 The evidence
showed that women had to weigh 14 to 25 pounds less than male
attendants of the same height and age.387 The reason for the difference
was that the airline used weight tables that distinguished between the
weights expected for those with large frames as opposed to medium
frames.388 For women, the medium frame standards from the weight
tables were used, while for men the large frame criteria were applied.389
Failure of the women to meet the standards led to either discipline or
termination.390
The Ninth Circuit based its conclusion, that the different standards
violated Title VII, on the Supreme Court's decision in UA W v. Johnson
Controls, Inc. 39 1 In that case, the employer had refused to allow
potentially fertile women to work in positions where there was the
possibility of lead exposure which, in the employer's mind, could be
harmful to a fetus.392 However, men capable of fathering children were
not excluded.393 The court found that there was no bona fide
occupational qualification that justified the apparently discriminatory
policy. 394 In Frank, the Ninth Circuit found that the employer had failed
to introduce evidence demonstrating that the essentials of the job
required that women be thinner than male flight attendants. 395 Thus,

383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.

Id. at 27.
Id.
216 F.3d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id.
Id. at 848.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 847.
Id. at 854 (citing UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1990)).
UA W, 499 U.S. at 192.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 206.
Frank, 216 F.3d at 855.
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there was no defense for the disparate treatment of the women. 396
On the ADEA claim, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
the weight standards constituted disparate treatment.397 The weight
standards applied to employees equally, regardless of age. 398 However,

the court reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment to the
defendant on the disparate impact claim.

399

It found that the lower court

erred in determining that the Supreme Court's decision in Hazen Paper
Co. v. Biggins400 barred disparate impact claims under the ADEA.4 °1
As to the disability claim in Frank, the court upheld the grant of
summary judgment for the airline.4 °2 The court found that while eating
disorders, which the plaintiffs claimed they suffered from because of the
employer's weight policies, can qualify as a disability under the ADA,
none of the plaintiffs had introduced evidence showing that eating
disorders substantially limited major life activities.40 3
While employers have to be aware that there are limitations posed
by federal civil rights laws on their ability to establish weight standards,
it is also clear that employers have some discretion regarding this
subject. It could be because the job requires such limitations. However,
it could also be because the employer has a legitimate concern regarding
the impression that an employee may create in the mind of the public. 4°
In Marks v. National Communications Ass 'n, a woman challenged
her employer's decision to deny her a promotion because she was
overweight. 40 5 The promotion would have created face-to-face contact
with customers, and the employer had informed her that an employee's
"presentation" (appearance) was important to succeed in the position.4 6
She was told if she lost weight, she would get the promotion.40 7
The plaintiff claimed that the conduct violated both Title VII and
state law barring discrimination based on gender.40 8 In particular, she

396.

Id.

397.

Id. at 856.

398.
399.
400.
401.
(9th Cir.

Id.
Id.
507 U.S. 604 (1993).
Frank, 216 F.3d at 856 (citing Arnett v. Cal. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 179 F.3d 690, 696
1999), vacated and remanded on other grounds,528 U.S. I 111 (2000)).
402. Id.

403. Id. at 857.
404.

See Marks v. Nat'l Commc'ns Ass'n., 72 F. Supp. 2d 322, 331 (S.D.N.Y 1999).

405.
406.
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408.

See id. at 325.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 326.
Id.at 325.
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claimed that, for the position, the employer was applying different
weight standards for men and women. 40 9 Her problem was that the
employer presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
decision. 4 0 The employer contended that appearance was important to
the position, and also introduced testimony that it did not have
overweight men in the position. 411 The court found in favor of the
employer because the plaintiff was unable to provide any specific
evidence of the identity of the men in the position who were
overweight.4 12

409. Id. at 327.
410. Id. at 331 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
411. Id.
412. Id. at 334.
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The Legality of Using Employee Appearance Policies to Promote Org
V. CONCLUSIONS

Table 1 briefly summarizes the major conclusions of this article on
the current rights of employers in designing appearance policies for their
employees. While no set of implied recommendations is a guarantee
against legal action, the table contains guidelines that follow legal
precedent.
TABLE 1:
EMPLOYER RIGHTS INDESIGNING APPEARANCE POLICIES
Employer Right
To

design

Example

Limitation
appearance

policies in general.

The

must

not

Immutable

based

on

include gender, race, color,

policy

discriminate
employees'

immutable

characteristics

or national origin.

or

differentially
members

characteristics

impact

of a

protected

class.

("Basic

Requirement")
To

design

appearance

policies that

promote

employer's

relationships

with

customers

and

Basic Requirement.

At-work restrictions on hair

an

length or hairstyle, facial
hair, clothing worn, jewelry
or cosmetics, and body

the

weight.

public,
To design policies to ensure
that

an

Basic Requirement.

Sexually suggestive

employee's

appearance

does

clothing.

not

compromise the well-being
or

of

performance

that

employee or others.
To

design

policies

that

appearance
restrict

Basic Requirement + the

Men

employer

ponytail length hair.

must

offer

a

employees from engaging in

reasonable accommodation,

religious practices on-the-

but

is

not

required

job.

provide

one

that

wearing

beards

or

to

would

cause the employer to suffer
an undue hardship
To

design

policies

that

appearance
restrict

Basic Requirement + the

Weight

restrictions

employees assigned to work

must

be

opportunities for "disabled"

legitimately tied to essential

applicants,

requirements of the job.

To change an appearance

Sufficient grounds include

policy,

changes in the employer's
perceptions

of

limitations

for

in a confined area.
Men wearing earrings.

social
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Appearance policies that help to define an organizational culture
provide important safeguards for the company and its employees.
Employees like the predictability, consistency, and dependability that are
provided by policies on personal appearance. Managers like the policies
because they provide the authority to enforce rules on appropriateness.
However, because policies delimit employee behavior, it is imperative
that they are legal and non-discriminatory impositions on individual
freedom.
The legislation and case law reviewed in this article suggests that
the courts have granted managers considerable latitude in developing
company policies that require employees to maintain an image that is
consistent with the business' organizational culture.413 Managers may
therefore set policies designed to control employee appearance including
restrictions on hair length or hairstyle, presence of a beard, clothing style
or type, jewelry worn on-the-job, and weight.4 14
However, the courts have been clear in their intent to allow
restrictive policies only when they promote the general wellbeing of the
company, which associatively promotes the wellbeing of the employees
affected by the policies.415 Additionally, the courts have shown
considerable sensitivity to community standards in determining when a
policy excessively impinges on individual employee behavior.4 16
413. See, e.g., Wislocki- Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1379 (7th Cir. 1987).
414. See, e.g., Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 134-37 (lst Cir. 2004)
(noting that Costco's facial piercing policy did not amount to discrimination); Wislocki- Goin, 831
F.2d at 1379 (holding that the plaintiff was discharged for failing to follow her employer's
legitimate business concerns regarding hair and makeup grooming policies); Fountain v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that Safeway's dress and grooming
regulations were not discriminatory in light of their good faith belief that their business required
them); Marks, 72 F. Supp. 2d. at 336 (holding that the employer's policy on weight was nondiscriminatory); EEOC v. Sambo's of Ga., 530 F. Supp. 86, 91 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (holding that being
clean shaven is a bona fide occupational requirement for the manager of a restaurant).
415. See, e.g., Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1215 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he
appearance of a company's employees may contribute greatly to the company's image and success
with the public and thus that a reasonable dress or grooming code is a proper management
prerogative." (citing Fagan v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1124-25 (D.C. Cir. 1973); La
Von Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (W.D. Mo. 1979))); Willingham v.
Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Similarly, an employer cannot have
one hiring policy for men and another for women if the distinction is based on some fundamental
right. But a hiring policy that distinguishes on some other ground.., is related more closely to the
employer's choice of how to run his business ... ").
416. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263, 266
(S.D. Ohio 1987) ("Even though defendants have expressed no discriminatory motive for the
'smock' rule, we find that the blatant effect of such a rule is to perpetuate sexual stereotypes .... In
contrast to the 'hair length' standards for male employees, the smock requirement finds no
justification in accepted social norms."); Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1087 (accepting the employer's
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Thus, business policies designed to promote a community-relevant
organizational culture that are respectful of legal rights can serve as
constructive safeguards for individual, company, and collective welfare.

contention that, in the community where the employer operated, people did not have a positive
opinion of men with long hair).
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